

CHAPTER TWO

CLEAVAGES, VALUE GAPS AND REGIME SUPPORT: EVIDENCE FROM CANADA AND 26 OTHER SOCIETIES

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Introduction

Canada, along with such countries as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland, is usually identified as being among that small cluster of states that qualify as “deeply divided” societies. Thirty-five years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) developed a comprehensive account of how deep and reinforcing social cleavages presented states with the challenges of integration and political support. Their pioneering account focused primarily on how party systems mediated societal cleavages based on religion, class, language and region.

Contemporary evidence suggests, however, that the “old” cleavages, which Lipset and Rokkan claimed decisively shaped states during the industrializing period, may be less prominent now than they once were. Some argue, for example, that class has become a progressively weaker predictor of voting behavior (Franklin, 1985; Franklin *et al.* 1992), and that the influence of organized religion seems to have waned as publics in most advanced industrial states have become more secular (Halman and Riis, 1999). Others contend that the shift towards post-industrialism has been accompanied by the emergence of “new” salient cleavages (Dalton, 2002). This exploration examines the impact of social differentiation and diversity from the vantage point of new cleavages.

We begin with an aggregate perspective of value change and stability in Canada over the last two decades. Our focus then shifts to consider the dynamics and potential implications of value differences across three “new” cleavages: those based on gender, generation, and differences between immigrants and native born Canadians. Two questions structure the investigation. First, to what extent has there been stability or change in the fundamental values of Canadians on different sides

of these respective cleavages? Have the number of significant value gaps across such “new” cleavages increased, decreased or remained stable? Second, does the presence or absence of value differences across these societal cleavages have any systematic consequences for regime support? Our general hypothesis is that societies with larger value differences across these cleavages are likely to have lower levels of regime support. The concluding section of the analysis expands the scope of the investigation to incorporate data from 26 other societies in order to test the generalizability of this proposition.

Cleavages

The place to start is with a clearer specification of the cleavages that are to be examined, and the determination of which fundamental values are under consideration. The gender cleavage, of course, is not a “new” cleavage in any literal sense; it has become more salient during the course of the last two decades or so in part because of the dynamics associated with post-industrialism. Norris and colleagues (Norris and Inglehart, 2003a; also see Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2003) make a strong case indicating that societal modernization and human development (see Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001) bring with them a rising tide of gender equality in post-industrial societies. They argue that,

throughout history, women in virtually all societies have had their life options restricted to the roles of wife and mother. Increasingly today, in postindustrial societies, almost any career and almost any lifestyle is opening up to them. These cultural changes have been important for men, but the transformation in the lives of women is far more dramatic, moving them from narrow subordination toward full equality. A radical change is altering women’s education, career opportunities, sexual behavior, and worldviews. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find that gender issues constitute such a central component—arguably, *the* most central component—of value change in postindustrial societies. (p. 159)

There is no reason to believe that Canada has escaped the effects of these same trends. Indeed, Canadian women have experienced the same structural changes that have transformed the position of women in other post-industrial states. The proportion of women enrolled in post-secondary educational institutions, for example, now outnumbers men, and women make up nearly half of the paid work force (Statistics

Canada). One consequence has been that, over the past twenty years, there has been a very substantial increase in the proportion of highly educated women in the paid workforce. Given these kinds of dramatic structural changes, it is not difficult to see why the gender gap has become more salient for Canadians today than it was in the past.

The second line of cleavage considered here concerns generational differences, the value differences between the young and the old. In the sociological sense, generations are usually defined as encompassing individuals “who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, (and who are) endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process” (Mannheim 1952:290). Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1997) theory of postmodern value change contends that economic development has contributed to an intergenerational shift in the value priorities of mass publics in advanced industrial states. Because younger generations were socialized during a period of relative affluence, they are likely to have worldviews that are different from those of older generations socialized under conditions of substantially less physical and material security:

During the period since World War II, advanced industrial societies have attained much higher real income levels than ever before in history. Coupled with the emergence of the welfare state, this has brought about a historically unprecedented situation: most of their population does not live under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This has led to a gradual shift in which needs for belonging, self-expression and a participant role in society became more prominent. (Inglehart, 1997:132)

This transformation, Inglehart argues, is just one part of a much broader shift in the values of younger generations which includes changing value orientations towards a variety of domains including “politics, work, family life, religion and sexual behavior.” There is clear evidence that intergenerational value change has been taking place in the Canadian setting. Furthermore, it is similar in direction and scope to intergenerational value changes found in other advanced industrial states (Nevitte 1996). Thus, the dynamics of population replacement in Canada suggest that, as elsewhere, the generational cleavage has the potential to demarcate a significant line of value differences within the Canadian population.

The third cleavage centers on value differences between immigrants and native-born Canadians. This cleavage is of increased concern to a growing number of states that seek to bolster sagging population levels through immigration, but it is of particular relevance to the Canadian

setting for a combination of reasons (Beaujot, 2003). First, more than virtually any other advanced industrial state, Canada has relied upon immigration as a source of population replacement. According to recent census data, immigration accounted for more than 50% of Canada's population growth between 1996 and 2001, and a very substantial 18% of the Canadian population was not born in the country. From the vantage point of value diversity, the implication is clear; this very sizable proportion of the Canadian population could not, by definition, have been socialized into "mainstream" Canadian norms during their formative years. Some of the aggregate level effects of these different socialization experiences on various political outlooks have been documented elsewhere (Nevitte and Kanji, 2003a, 2003b; Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003), and it is reasonable to suppose that such differences might apply equally to a variety of social and economic outlooks. Second, since the 1960s, there has been a dramatic shift in the countries of origin of Canadian immigrants. Until the 1960s, immigrants from "traditional" source countries (Western Europe and the United States) outnumbered those coming from non-traditional source countries (Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean) by a ratio of about 9:1. By the middle of the 1980s, that pattern had completely reversed; immigrants from non-traditional source countries outnumbered those from traditional source countries by a ratio of about 3:1. Given that new immigrants tend to increasingly come from environments that are more culturally dissimilar to their new host country, there are good reasons not only to anticipate significant value differences between immigrants and native-born Canadians, but also to expect to find substantial value differences between immigrants from traditional versus non-traditional source countries.

Value Dimensions

The similarities and differences between men and women, the young and the old, and immigrants and non-immigrants, might be compared across a vast array of value outlooks. To identify, empirically, a manageable number of coherent value domains for analysis, we employed an exploratory factor analysis of the 1981, 1990 and 2000 waves of the WVS. The initial step in the research began by considering some 80 indicators representing a broad range of values including what people valued in life, orientations toward family life, attitudes toward work,

Table 2.1. Factor Analysis—Fundamental Value Dimensions in Canada.

Dimensions and indicators ^a	Factor loadings	Communalities
<i>1. Subjective religiosity</i>		
Belief in heaven	.78	.67
Belief in God	.74	.59
Importance of God	.73	.59
Belief in life after death	.63	.42
Importance of religion	.62	.51
Belief in hell	.60	.48
Eigenvalue: 4.48		
% of variance: 13.17		
Cronbach's Alpha: .79		
<i>2. Church leadership</i>		
Churches give adequate answers to moral problems	.83	.71
Churches give adequate answers to family problems	.81	.71
Churches give adequate answers to social problems	.73	.59
Churches give adequate answers to spiritual needs	.71	.54
Eigenvalue: 2.09		
% of variance: 6.15		
Cronbach's Alpha: .81		
<i>3. Moral permissiveness</i>		
Divorce is justifiable	.76	.59
Abortion is justifiable	.76	.62
Homosexuality is justifiable	.69	.54
Euthanasia is justifiable	.63	.45
Suicide is justifiable	.55	.36
Eigenvalue: 2.34		
% of variance: 6.88		
Cronbach's Alpha: .74		
<i>4. Civil permissiveness</i>		
Avoiding a fare on public transports is justifiable	.75	.57
Accepting a bribe on duty is justifiable	.72	.53
Claiming government benefits that are not entitled	.72	.53
Cheating on taxes is justifiable	.71	.53
Eigenvalue: 1.99		
% of variance: 5.85		
Cronbach's Alpha: .67		

Table 2.1 (*Cont.*)

Dimensions and indicators ^a	Factor loadings	Communalities
<i>5. Market economics</i>		
Competition is good vs. harmful	.77	.63
Private vs. government ownership should be increased	.74	.58
Eigenvalue: 1.14 % of variance: 3.35 Cronbach's Alpha: .40		
<i>6. Technology and science</i>		
More emphasis on the development of technology	.79	.64
Scientific advances will help (or harm) mankind	.79	.64
Eigenvalue: 1.36 % of variance: 4.00 Cronbach's Alpha: .48		
<i>7. Women and work</i>		
Both husband and wife should contribute to household income	.81	.68
A working mom can have a good relationship with her kids	.78	.65
Eigenvalue: 1.33 % of variance: 3.90 Cronbach's Alpha: .45		
<i>8. Teaching children independence</i>		
Independence is important for children to learn at home	.80	.68
Obedience is important for children to learn at home	.73	.63
Eigenvalue: 1.13 % of variance: 3.31 Cronbach's Alpha: .41		
<i>9. Workplace conditions</i>		
Good hours is an important aspect of a job	.74	.58
Good pay is an important aspect of a job	.68	.51
Generous holidays is an important aspect of a job	.68	.59
Eigenvalue: 1.38 % of variance: 4.07 Cronbach's Alpha: .58		

Table 2.1 (Cont.)

Dimensions and indicators	Factor loadings	Communalities
10. <i>Workplace motivations</i>		
An opportunity to use initiative is an important aspect of a job	.68	.50
A job that meets one’s abilities is important	.66	.47
A job in which you can achieve something is important	.58	.38
A responsible job is important		
Eigenvalue: 1.90		
% of variance: 5.59		
Cronbach’s Alpha: .55		
11. <i>Postmaterialism</i>		
As measured by Inglehart’s standard 4-item battery		

Note: The preceding factor analysis was conducted using Principal Component Analysis, with Varimax rotation.

^a For exact question wording and coding see Appendix A.

Source: 2000 World Values Survey.

future orientations, views about the economy; their religious outlooks, ethical outlooks, and moral priorities. After repeated iterations, ten fairly robust factors, based on 34 different indicators emerged. We note that the ten dimensions encompass a wide variety of value domains, and these same domains also emerge from exploratory factor analysis of the WVS data in other countries.¹

The first two dimensions consider religious values. *Subjective religiosity* measures personal religious belief, while the *church leadership* factor reflects views about the adequacy of church leadership on issues of the day. The third and fourth dimensions consider orientations toward *moral* and *civil permissiveness*,² while the fifth and sixth dimensions consider support for free markets (*market economics*) and beliefs about the role of *technology and science* in society. Two dimensions capture different aspects of family values. The first deals with attitudes toward *women and work* (or working mothers), and the second with, *teaching children independence*

¹ Following each “sweep” of the data, variables with the weakest factor loadings or communalities were dropped from consideration. These same value dimensions repeatedly re-emerged across different time points, and across different countries.

² These dimensions have repeatedly emerged in other analyses of WVS data. Norris and Inglehart 2003; Nevitte 1996.

(or child rearing values). Two dimensions related to the workplace also emerge. The first, *workplace conditions*, is a dimension that has to do with the importance of factors such as hours of work, the level of pay, and the number of holidays, while the *workplace motivations* dimension measures support for such expressive considerations as opportunities to use one's initiative, and the desire to be personally challenged in the workplace. In addition to these ten value dimensions, our analysis also includes the now standard four-item post-materialism scale (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, Baganez and Moreno 1998), which is designed to tap material versus post-material outlooks. In all, the following analysis considers eleven value dimensions.

Findings

Table 2.2 begins by looking generally at the evolution of Canadian values on these dimensions, and the evidence indicates that there have been significant value shifts across ten of the eleven value dimensions considered. The exception to the pattern concerns value stability on the workplace conditions dimension. Moreover, in the cases for which there are data across the entire two decades, the indications are that the 1990–2000 value changes have typically continued along the trajectory evident from the trends found in the 1981–1990 period. Most striking, perhaps, are the relatively sharp increases in subjective religiosity, the increased support for women in the workplace, and the increased proportion of people who attach great importance to teaching children the value of independence. There are also some noteworthy changes in the opposite direction: significantly fewer people think that church leadership on the issues of the day is adequate, there has been a significant decline in the importance people attach to expressive workplace motivations, and support for the market economy has also declined. These aggregate changes are an important starting point. If significant value changes have taken place, it is entirely possible that there may also be significant changes in the scope and scale of the value gaps across various cleavages. However, what needs to be determined is first, whether the value gaps across cleavages have widened, remained stable, or narrowed, and, second, whether those value gaps are consequential for political support.

Table 2.2. Value Change in Canada.

Value dimension	Year 1981	1990	2000	Trend Trajectory
Subjective religiosity <i>(high)</i>		29%	38%***	Rising
Church leadership <i>(adequate)</i>		36%	28%***	Falling
Moral permissiveness <i>(high)</i>	8%	24%	27%***	Rising
Civil permissiveness <i>(low)</i>	76%	79%	83%***	Rising
Market economics <i>(high support)</i>		75%	68%***	Falling
Technology and science <i>(high support)</i>	52%	58%	62%***	Rising
Women and work <i>(strong support)</i>		8%	16%***	Rising
Teaching kids independence <i>(strong support)</i>	21%	37%	48%***	Rising
Workplace conditions <i>(very important)</i>	21%	20%	20%	Stable
Workplace motivations <i>(very important)</i>	32%	30%	21%***	Falling
Postmaterialism	15%	24%	28%***	Rising

*** significant at $p < .001$

Source: 1981, 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys.

The gender gap

Table 2.3 captures the evolution of gender differences across each of the eleven value dimensions and, on balance, the indications are that there has been a widening of the average gender gap on these value dimensions. Canadian males and females both became more religious over the last decade, but the increase was steeper for women than for men, and thus there has been a slight value divergence on this dimension. Conversely, confidence in the adequacy of church leadership declined over the 1990–2000 decade, but the rate of decline was steeper for men than for women, and the gender difference on this dimension is now statistically significant.

When it comes to moral and civil permissiveness, the trends are less consistent. Although the magnitude of the gender gap on the moral permissiveness dimension has narrowed, the gender differences have

Table 2.3. The Gender Gap in Canada.

Value dimension	1981 Male	Female	Gap	1990 Male	Female	Gap	2000 Male	Female	Gap	Gap 1981-2000
Subjective religiosity <i>(high)</i>				26%	32%	6%***	33%	41%	8%***	Diverging
Church leadership <i>(adequate)</i>				34%	37%	3%	24%	31%	7%*	Diverging
Moral permissiveness <i>(high)</i>	6%	11%	5%	22%	26%	4%	25%	28%	3%*	Converging
Civil permissiveness <i>(low)</i>	74%	77%	3%	76%	82%	6%*	79%	85%	6%**	Stable (1990-2000)
Market economics <i>(high support)</i>				75%	74%	1%	71%	65%	6%*	Diverging
Technology and science <i>(high support)</i>	55%	49%	6%	62%	54%	8%***	70%	56%	14%***	Diverging
Women and work <i>(strong support)</i>				7%	10%	3%*	13%	18%	5%**	Diverging
Teaching kids independence <i>(strong support)</i>	16%	27%	11%***	35%	39%	4%*	46%	49%	3%	Converging
Workplace conditions <i>(very important)</i>	23%	18%	5%**	22%	19%	3%*	22%	20%	3%**	Stable (1990-2000)
Workplace motivations <i>(very important)</i>	33%	31%	2%*	30%	30%	0%	23%	20%	3%**	Diverging (1990-2000)
Postmaterialism	16%	13%	3%*	29%	19%	10%***	31%	25%	6%	Converging (1990-2000)
Average gender gap (total gaps / total value dimensions)	5%			4.36%			5.73%			

* significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001.

Source: 1981, 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys.

become more significant. Conversely, the difference between males and females on the issue of civil permissiveness has remained relatively stable over the last decade, and it continues to remain significant.

With respect to economic values, support for the market economy has declined among both men and women, but men are consistently more supportive of free markets than women, and the gender gap has become significant. The most striking finding of all concerns the very substantial gender gap on values related to beliefs in technology and science. This significant value gap has almost doubled in size over the course of the last twenty years, with men being more inclined to support the advancement of science and technology in spite of the sharp increases in the proportion of women with very high levels of formal education.

As far as family values are concerned, both Canadian men and women have become more supportive of working mothers, but support for working mothers has increased more sharply among women than among men. Thus, the gender gap on this dimension has not only widened, but continues to be significant. Intriguingly, however, when it comes to child rearing values, both men and women increasingly support the idea that independence is an important value to teach children. In fact, this is one of the few dimensions where the gender gap has narrowed to become insignificant.

Workplace values have also changed. Such working conditions as good hours, good pay and good holidays have gradually become more important for women, but remained more or less stable for men. Thus, on this dimension, the gender gap has narrowed slightly, but continues to be stable and significant. On the other dimension of workplace orientations, however, the evidence indicates that expressive considerations have become less important factors in motivating both men and women's employment choices, although the gender gap in this case has reemerged as being significant.

Finally, with respect to the post-materialist value dimension, the overall trend is consistent; both men and women in Canada have become increasingly post-materialist in their outlooks over the last two decades, but on this dimension the gender gap has narrowed and is no longer significant. Men are no longer significantly more post-materialist than women.

On balance, the bulk of evidence points to an increasingly significant and widening gender gap across these value domains. Of the eleven different value dimensions examined, the value differences between men

and women in Canada have clearly converged and become insignificant on only two dimensions.

The generation gap

Table 2.4 considers the very same value dimensions, and, in this case, we consider the generational divide to be defined as those born before 1945 and those born after 1960. The intriguing finding here is that the overall pattern is one of value convergence rather than divergence. Even so, there are nonetheless significant generational value gaps on seven of the eleven dimensions under consideration.

As one would expect, older Canadians tend to be more religious than their younger counterparts, but both the young and the old have become more religious since 1990. In this instance, the generation gap remains intact. Furthermore, older generations are more inclined than the young to believe that churches provide adequate leadership, although both groups have become less sanguine about the role of the church since 1990. However, even on this dimension, the generation gap remains significant.

The generation gap turns out to be widest on the two dimensions that measure different aspects of permissiveness. In both cases, younger generations tend to be significantly more permissive than older generations. The truly striking finding concerns the shifts within the moral permissiveness dimension. Here, the size of the generation gap has virtually tripled over the last two decades. With respect to the civil permissiveness dimension, there are also very substantial generational differences, but the overall pattern is one of convergence; both young and old have become less inclined to regard as justifiable violations of what might be regarded as “community standards”.

While different generations exhibit substantial differences with respect to permissiveness, differences in their orientations towards the economy, and technology and scientific advances have become insignificant. Support for the market economy has declined both among the younger and older generations, while support for technology and science has increased.

Support for women working outside the home virtually doubled between 1990 and 2000, but, not surprisingly, younger generations tend to be more inclined to support the idea than their older counterparts. On balance, the generation gap on this dimension has remained stable and significant. When it comes to child rearing values, however, the

Table 2.4. The Generation Gap in Canada.

Value dimension	1981		1990		2000		Gap 1981-2000
	Pre45	Post60	Pre45	Post60	Pre45	Post60	
Subjective religiosity <i>(high)</i>			34%	25%	9%*	35%	9%*** Stable
Church leadership <i>(adequate)</i>			47%	29%	18%***	23%	13%*** Converging
Moral permissiveness <i>(very permissive)</i>	5%	11%	17%	25%	8%**	32%	16%*** Diverging
Civil permissiveness <i>(low tolerance)</i>	84%	58%	87%	69%	18%***	76%	15%*** Converging
Market economics <i>(high support)</i>			70%	77%	7%*	67%	1% Converging
Technology and science <i>(high support)</i>	54%	46%	60%	56%	4%***	62%	1% Converging
Women and work <i>(strong support)</i>			6%	10%	4%***	17%	4%*** Stable
Teaching kids independence <i>(strong support)</i>	21%	20%	29%	43%	14%***	48%	6% Converging (1990-2000)
Workplace conditions <i>(very important)</i>	21%	20%	22%	18%	4%**	20%	3%*** Converging (1990-2000)
Workplace motivations <i>(very important)</i>	30%	31%	30%	30%	0%	21%	0% Stable (1990-2000)
Postmaterialism	15%	13%	24%	24%	0%	31%	7%*** Diverging (1990-2000)
Average generation gap (total gaps/total value dimensions)	6.43%		7.82%			6.82%	

* significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001.

Source: 1981, 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys.

generation gap has narrowed. Since 1990, the outlook of the older generation of Canadians has “caught up” with those of younger generation, to the point that the generational gap is no longer significant.

The evidence concerning workplace outlook is that there are modest but significant differences between the young and the old on working conditions; the young are somewhat more inclined than older Canadians to think that traditional job benefits are important. There is, however, no evidence of any generation gap when it comes to the importance attached to expressive benefits of the workplace. However, there have been significant shifts in the distribution of post-materialist values across the generations, and these are consistent with the direction of change predicted by the theory; younger Canadians are significantly more post-materialist than their older counterparts, and this gap has widened considerably, particularly since 1990.

On balance, the data indicate that, on these basic value dimensions, younger Canadians are more likely to disagree than to agree with their older counterparts. There is a significant generational gap on the majority of dimensions considered, even though the gap appears to be narrowing somewhat.

The immigration gap

To what extent is there evidence of significant value divides between native born Canadians and immigrants? Table 2.5 examines the value differences between native born Canadians and immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source countries. Overall, and for reasons already outlined (Schultz, Unipan and Gamba, 2000), the expectation is that the value orientations of immigrants from traditional source countries will be more like those of native born Canadians, and that the “value gap” will be wider between native born Canadians and those from non-traditional source countries. The data support that expectation. The values of immigrants from non-traditional source countries are diverging from those of native born Canadians on nine of the eleven dimensions considered. By comparison, there is value divergence between immigrants from traditional source countries and native born Canadians on only four dimensions. The widest and most significant gaps emerge on the following dimensions: immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more supportive of church leadership, they are less post-materialist, and they are less permissive on moral questions. By the same token, immigrants from non-traditional source

Table 2.5. The Immigration Gap in Canada.

Value dimension	1990		2000		Gaps		Gap 1990 2000					
	Native born	Immigrants ^a	Native born	Immigrants	Trad.	Nontrad.	Native born vs. Trad.	Native born vs. nontrad.				
		Trad.	Nontrad.	1	2	1	2					
Subjective religiosity <i>(high)</i>	28%	33%	33%	5% ^{**}	5%*	37%	40%	45%	3%*	8%	Converging	Diverging
Church leadership <i>(adequate)</i>	35%	38%	50%	3%	15%	27%	28%	35%	1%	8% ^{**}	Converging	Converging
Moral permissiveness <i>(very permissive)</i>	24%	25%	18%	1%	6% ^{**}	28%	27%	15%	1%	13% ^{***}	Stable	Diverging
Civil permissiveness <i>(low tolerance)</i>	79%	79%	79%	0%	0%	83%	86%	77%	3%	6%	Diverging	Diverging
Market economics <i>(high support)</i>	76%	67%	66%	9%*	10%	68%	76%	61%	8%	7%	Converging	Converging
Technology and science <i>(high support)</i>	57%	58%	60%	1%*	3%	61%	64%	71%	3%	10%*	Diverging	Diverging
Women and work <i>(strong support)</i>	9%	6%	11%	3%	2%	17%	12%	13%	5%	4%*	Diverging	Diverging
Teaching kids independence <i>(strong support)</i>	37%	40%	36%	3%	1%	49%	55%	34%	6%	15% ^{**}	Diverging	Diverging
Workplace conditions <i>(very important)</i>	21%	18%	22%	3%	1%	20%	22%	24%	2%	4%	Converging	Diverging
Workplace motivations <i>(very important)</i>	29%	32%	29%	3%	0%	21%	24%	19%	3%	2%	Stable	Diverging
Postmaterialism	23%	27%	28%	4%	5%	28%	32%	18%	4%	10%*	Stable	Diverging
Average immigration gap (total gaps/total value dimensions)				3.18%	4.36%				3.55%	7.91%		

^a The preceding results compare the immigration gap between native born Canadians and two distinct types of immigrants – those from traditional source countries (trad.) and those from nontraditional source countries (nontrad.).

^b Gap 1 reflects differences between native born Canadians and immigrants from traditional source countries. Gap 2 reflects differences between native born Canadians and immigrants from nontraditional societies.

* significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001.

Source: 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys.

countries are also more inclined than native born Canadians to express greater confidence in science and technology, they are less likely to be preoccupied with teaching their children independence, and they are less likely to support working mothers.

Overall, these data show more significant value gaps between native born Canadians and immigrants in 2000 than in 1990, and, on average, the value gaps between native born Canadians and both types of immigrants have widened.

Value Diversity and Regime Support: Two Tests

Evidently, there are significant value gaps across the three lines of cleavage. Moreover, the aggregate evidence indicates that there was greater value diversity in 2000 than in 1990. For all three cleavages, and across all eleven dimensions considered, the number of significant value gaps increased during the course of the decade.

One central insight provided by the Lipset and Rokkan line of theorizing was that deep value differences across cleavages signified challenges to societal integration that were consequential for regime support. In their original formulation, Lipset and Rokkan presumed, quite reasonably, that such objective differences as class, religious denomination, and cultural peripheries and centers provided reliable proxies for salient subjective value outlooks within different segments of these industrializing populations. In the post-industrial context, however, it is less clear that objective structural differences correspond as neatly as they once did to subjective value differences because of the value changes that have taken place. With the WVS data supplying directly comparable cross-time measures of the subjective values of populations, it becomes possible to provide a more direct test of the central proposition; namely, that *value diversity* across cleavages is associated systematically with variations in regime support.

A deeply divided society, one with a history of deep internal regional divisions (Simeon and Elkins, 1980), and one that evidently does have growing value gaps across significant cleavage lines, Canada serves as a useful initial test case. In this instance, the hypothesis is that, in those regions where value diversity is greatest, regime support is expected to be lowest.

By taking together the cumulative size of all of the value gaps across all three cleavages as indicating the extent of value diversity, it becomes possible to evaluate which of Canada's four main regions are relatively

more, or less, diverse. By that measure, Quebec and Western Canada turn out to exhibit greater value diversity than do either Ontario or Atlantic Canada.

The data summarized in Figure 2.1 locate respondents in each of Canada's regions in a conceptual grid defined by levels of value diversity and confidence in governmental institutions. Levels of political support are measured by the extent to which respondents express higher or lower levels of confidence in the key institutions of the regime—"parliament" and "the government of Ottawa". The data indicate support for the hypothesis that support for governmental institutions is lowest in those regions where there is greater value diversity across the three cleavages (Quebec and Western Canada), and it is highest in the region (Ontario) where there is less value diversity.³


Demonstrating that greater value diversity is associated with variations in regime support within one country suggests only that the central hypothesis is plausible. However, a far more stringent set of tests is required for a theory to be potentially generalizable. First, the test would have to be conducted in multiple settings. Second, such a test would also have to empirically take into account other plausible explanations that might be considered as equally compelling reasons for variations in political support.

To conduct a broader test of the general hypothesis we can turn, once again, to WVS data from a variety of other countries. Figure 2.2 summarizes the general findings for the relationship between value diversity and regime support in 27 countries in 2000. In this instance, it is not possible to examine the value diversity across the immigrant versus native born populations because the country of birth variable was not included in the WVS in most countries participating in the surveys. The analysis reported in Figure 2.2, therefore, considers the same eleven value dimensions across the two cleavages (gender and generation) for which reliable data are available.

The essential finding is that there appears to be a significant cross-national pattern; the greater the value diversity within publics across the two cleavages, the lower the levels of public confidence in governmental institutions. In effect, for every one hundred point increase in

³ Clearly, it is not social differentiation but value diversity that appears to be more important to regime support. In the Canadian setting, Ontario is socially more diverse than other parts of the country.

Figure 2.1. Diversity and Confidence in Government Institutions in Canada.




Source: 2000 World Values Surveys.

the value diversity index, there is a one point decline on the confidence in governmental institutions index.

There are, of course, a variety of possible reasons other than value diversity itself that might prompt publics to have greater, or lesser, support for governmental institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995; Newton and Norris, 2000). A more robust test turns on the question of whether the degree of value diversity remains a significant predictor of variations in confidence in governmental institutions once other possible sources of variation are taken into account. First, there are possible political explanations to consider. Publics who generally support democratic political systems, and who are more politically engaged, might be expected to express greater confidence in governmental institutions regardless of levels of diversity, or cohesion, in their core values. Then

Figure 2.2. Diversity and Confidence in Government Institutions in 27 Societies.



Source: 2000 World Values Surveys.

again, confidence in governmental institutions might well be related to such basic political outlooks as those relating to authority orientations (Eckstein 1969; Nevitte 1996).

In addition to these “political” explanations, there are also possible societal explanations to consider. For example, there are strong reasons to suppose that confidence in governmental institutions could well be attributable to levels of interpersonal trust. Both Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993, 2000) make a persuasive case that the effective functioning of governmental and non-governmental institutions is closely related to interpersonal trust and “the norms of reciprocity”. One also might suppose that publics with high levels of “life satisfaction” might be inclined to express greater “satisfaction,” or confidence in governmental institutions.

Table 2.6. Regression analysis—The Determinants of Confidence in Governmental Institutions

Predictors	Beta
Life satisfaction <i>(societies with high levels of life satisfaction)</i>	-.28**
Support for the democratic political system <i>(societies where support for democracy is low)</i>	-.42**
Political engagement <i>(societies where the frequency of political discussion is high)</i>	.20**
Willingness to challenge political authority <i>(societies with higher protest activity/potential)</i>	-.17**
Interpersonal trust <i>(societies with high levels of interpersonal trust)</i>	.01*
Degree of diversity <i>(more diverse societies)</i>	-.35**
Constant	11.19**
R ²	.49

* significant at $p < .05$; ** significant at $p < .001$.

Source: 2000 World Values Survey.

To explore whether value diversity is related systematically to levels of confidence in governmental institutions, we turn to a multivariate model, one that is tested using 2000 WVS data from all of the 27 countries considered in Table 2.6. Confidence in governmental institutions, our proxy for political support, is the dependent variable, and indicators for life satisfaction, support for the democratic political system, political engagement, willingness to challenge political authority and interpersonal trust, along with degree of societal value diversity, are entered as control variables.

The overall findings are clear. All of the variables exhibit statistically significant effects, and the effects operate in the direction that most of the theoretical literature would expect. Political engagement, for example, is positively and significantly related to confidence in governmental institutions, and, in those societies where protest activity and potential is higher, confidence in governmental institutions is lower. The only

exception is that greater life satisfaction appears to lead to lower, and not higher, levels of confidence in governmental institutions.

The most significant findings to emerge, however, concern the relative predictive power of the independent variables which together account for a very substantial 49% of the variance in the dependant variable. It comes as little surprise to find that all of the explicitly political variables—support for the democratic system, political engagement, and willingness to challenge political authority—emerge as significant predictors. Indeed, general evaluations of the democratic political system is the single most powerful predictor of all. Two other findings are, perhaps, more surprising. First, of all of the “non-political” variables, the degree of value diversity is by far the most powerful predictor of levels of confidence in governmental institutions ($-.35$). The greater the level of value diversity in these societies, the lower the levels of public support for governmental institutions. The second surprising finding to emerge is that, once other factors, including value diversity, are taken into account, interpersonal trust contributes very little explanatory leverage (.01) in levels of public confidence in institutions.

Concluding Discussion

We began with the observation that value cleavages have long been considered to be pertinent to understanding variations in regime support. The pioneering contribution of Lipset and Rokkan serves as a foundation for interpreting how party systems mediated powerful societal cleavages during the transformations associated with the dynamics of industrialism. This analysis has attempted to advance those conceptual concerns in two directions. First, we argue that objective cleavages, by themselves, are not a significant basis from which to understand variations in regime support; rather, what is required is a more nuanced view of the interactions of cleavages and structural and value change. Second, we suggest that the scope and scale of value gaps across “new” cleavages may provide a useful vantage point from which to explore variations in regime support in post-industrial states. As societies become more diverse, and as new cleavages emerge as increasingly salient to more mobile societies, the goal of understanding the linkages between value diversity and “governability” becomes more pressing.

The Canadian case is an apt starting point for evaluating how value change and diversity might be related to regime support. It is a

deeply divided advanced industrial state with atypically high levels of population mobility. Of course, one case, however illuminating, is an insufficient foundation for exploring a general hypothesis.

The analyses of cross-national evidence, however, suggests a broader application with broader implications. For reasons of practicality, this particular investigation was limited to considering two cleavages and eleven value dimensions in 27 countries. What is clearly required is a broader research agenda that includes for consideration a greater number of cleavages, in more countries, and across more time points.

Appendix A: Operationalization and Coding

Interpersonal trust

Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

Most people can be trusted = 1; need to be careful = 0.

Civic engagement

Question: Please look at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, you belong to.

Included in the 1981, 1990 and 2000 WVS were:

Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Religious or church organizations (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Education, arts, music or cultural activities (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Labor unions (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Political parties or groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Third world development or human rights (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Professional associations (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs etc.)

New organizations and activities added to the 1990 and 2000 WVS include:

Sports and recreation (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Women's groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Peace movement (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Voluntary organizations concerned with health (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Other groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Religious beliefs

Question: For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important?

Religion (not at all important = 4; very important = 1)

Question: Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?

Do you believe in God? (no = 1; yes = 0)

Do you believe in life after death? (no = 1; yes = 0)

Do you believe in hell? (no = 1; yes = 0)

Do you believe in heaven? (no = 1; yes = 0)

Question: How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate: 10 means very important, and 1 means not at all important.

(1 to 5 = 1; 6 to 10 = 0)

The "religious beliefs" index adds the preceding six indicators into a composite measure, where 0, means highly religious, and 6, means not very religious.

Role of the church

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are giving adequate answers to:

The moral problems and needs of the individual? (no = 1; yes = 0)

The problems of family life? (no = 1; yes = 0)

People's spiritual needs? (no = 1; yes = 0)

The social problems facing our country today? (no = 1; yes = 0)

The "role of the church" index adds the preceding four indicators into a composite measure, where 0, means that the church plays an adequate role, and 4, means that the church plays a not so adequate role.

Moral permissiveness

Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements on this card whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

Homosexuality (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Abortion (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Divorce (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Euthanasia (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Suicide (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

The “moral permissiveness” index adds the preceding five indicators into a composite measure, where 0 means not very morally permissive, and 5 means very morally permissive.

Civil permissiveness

Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements on this card whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Avoiding a fare on public transport (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Cheating on taxes if you have a chance (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (6 to 10 = 1; 0 to 5 = 0)

The “civil permissiveness” index adds the preceding four indicators into a composite measure, where 0 indicates a low tolerance for civil permissiveness, and 5 a high tolerance for civil permissiveness.

Market economics

Question: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas (statement on the left). OR Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people (statement on the right).

(0 to 5 = 1; 6 to 10 = 0)

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased (statement on the left). OR Government ownership of business and industry should be increased (statement on the right).

(0 to 5 = 1; 6 to 10 = 0)

The “market economics” index adds the preceding two indicators into a composite measure, where 0 indicates low support for a market-based economy, and 2 means a high level of support for a market-based economy.

Technology and science

Question: I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing or you don't mind.

More emphasis on the development of technology (good = 3; don't mind = 2; bad = 1)

Question: In the long run, do you think the scientific advances we are making will help or harm mankind?

(help = 3; both = 2; harm = 1)

The “technology and science” index adds the preceding two indicators into a composite measure, where 2 means a low support for technology and science, and 6 means a high level of support for technology and science.

Women and work

Question: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly?

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (agree strongly = 4; agree = 3; disagree = 2; disagree strongly = 1)

Both husband and wife should contribute to household income (agree strongly = 4; agree = 3; disagree = 2; disagree strongly = 1)

The “woman and work” index adds the preceding two indicators into a composite measure, where 2 means low support for working mothers, and 8 means very strong support for working mothers.

Child rearing

Question: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.

Independence (important = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Obedience (not mentioned = 1; important = 0)

The “child rearing” index adds the preceding two indicators into a composite measure, where 0 indicates low support for encouraging children to learn to be independent, and 2 means a high level of support for encouraging children to learn to be independent.

Conditional attributes of employment

Question: Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are very important?

Good pay (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Good hours (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

Generous holidays (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

The “conditional attributes of employment” index adds the preceding three indicators into a composite measure, where 0 means low support for the conditional attributes of employment, and 3 means a high level of support for the conditional attributes of employment.

Intrinsic attributes of employment

Question: Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are very important?

An opportunity to use initiative (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

A job in which you can achieve something (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

A responsible job (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

A job that meets one’s abilities (mentioned = 1; not mentioned = 0)

The “intrinsic attributes of employment” index adds the preceding four indicators into a composite measure, where 0 means low support for the intrinsic attributes of employment, and 3 means a high level of support for the intrinsic attributes of employment.

Post-materialism

This indicator is operationalized using Inglehart's standard 4-item battery.

For details, see (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, Basanez and Mareno, 1998)

Degree of social cohesion

For the Canadian component of this analysis, this indicator is measured by adding the gender, generation and immigration gaps. For the cross-national component of this analysis, this indicator is measured by adding the gender and generation gaps.

(regional/societal scores = total percentage spread)

Life satisfaction

Question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

(societal scores = average life satisfaction on a scale from 1, meaning dissatisfied, to 10, meaning satisfied)

Support for the democratic political system

Question: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a democratic political system (societal scores = average societal ratings)

Political engagement

Question: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?

(societal scores = average percentage of frequent discussion)

Willingness to challenge political authority

Question: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it

Signing a petition (have done = 3; might do = 2; would never do = 1)

Joining in boycotts (have done = 3; might do = 2; would never do = 1)

Attending lawful demonstrations (have done = 3; might do = 2; would never do = 1)

Joining unofficial strikes (have done = 3; might do = 2; would never do = 1)

(societal scores = average level of willingness to challenge political authority based on an additive index constructed from the preceding four indicators)

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